LESSON 8 SUPPORTING, PREASSAULT, AND DECEPTION OPERATIONS

[Shwartzkopf's] intention was to <u>deceive</u> Iraqi commanders into believing that the main effort would come into Kuwait only and that the <u>supporting</u> attacks would come through western Kuwait and from an <u>amphibious</u> assault.

-- Col Charles J. Quilter, USMCR
U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991

Introduction

Purpose

This lesson presents the types of advance force operations, their relationship to amphibious operations in support of joint and multinational campaigns, and the advantages and disadvantages of conducting supporting, preassault, and deception operations.

Why Study Supporting, Preassault, & Deception Operations?

Today, as in the past, deception must be an integral part of any operation. A critical item of planning during the initial planning conference is the requirement for *deception operations*. Deception operations are essential to accomplishing surprise in almost any successful amphibious assault. Deception is normally achieved before or during the early stages of the assault

Relationship to Other Instruction

This lesson is relevant to

wPrevious instruction which provided you with an amphibious operations doctrinal foundation.

wDefining specific Marine Air-Ground Task Force and Amphibious Task Force capabilities and planning considerations for inclusion in the development of an overarching joint and/or multinational campaign conducted at the operational level of war.

Study Time

This lesson, including the issues for consideration, will require about 3 hours of study.

Educational Objectives

Advance Force Operations	List the types of advance force operations and explain their relationship to amphibious operations in support of joint and multinational campaigns. [JPME Areas 1(a), 2(a), 3(a), and 3(c)]
Supporting, Preassault, and Deception Operations	Explain the advantages and disadvantages of conducting supporting, preassault, and deception operations. [JPME Areas 2(a), 3(a), 3(c), and 4(e)]
Advance Force Operations	Explain the purpose and objectives of advance force or preassault operations. [JPME Areas 2(a), 3(a), and 3(c)]
JPME Areas/ Objectives/Hours (accounting data)	_, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -,

Discussion

Amphibious Operations

Amphibious operations are conducted to enable the introduction of larger forces, to support a main effort elsewhere, or as the main effort in a joint and/or multinational campaign.

The mere threat posed by the presence of powerful amphibious forces can serve as a deterrent to hostile action; shield intent and primary objectives; induce the enemy to disperse his forces in efforts to defend his coastline; or fix enemy forces in place, thus preventing them from reacting to the main effort.

In amphibious operations, *supporting*, *preassault*, and *deception* operations create a threat to the enemy that can result in him making expensive and wasteful decisions concerning his forces and relative combat power.

Planning Conference

In addition to the four basic decisions reached during the initial planning conference, the CATF and the CLF may discuss the following:

WInformation on the location of the forces of both commands and possible embarkation ports

wPros and cons of employing an advance force

WAdvance force composition

wForming of the attached groups and landing groups for the operation

wTentative D-day and H-hour

wRequirements for rehearsals

Supporting and Preassault Operations

The CATF may specify the principal plans to be prepared and establish time limits for each major step in the planning process by establishing a staff planning schedule. Of particular importance, the CATF and CLF may discuss and develop initial concepts for *supporting* and *preassault* operations.

Operations conducted in the objective area before and during the assault phase in support of the main landing may include *preassault operations* and subsidiary landings by the advanced force or main body, or *supporting operations* conducted with forces other than those assigned to the Amphibious Task Force (ATF).

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Discussion, Continued

Advance Force

After consulting with CLF, the CATF may decide to use an advance force after weighing the relative advantages and disadvantages of strategic, operational, and tactical surprise and the requirements for preparing the objective area.

After the decision has been made, CLF is responsible for preparing landing force requirements and allocating forces to accompany the advance force commander.

Deception Operations

A critical item of planning during the initial planning conference is the requirement for *deception operations*. *Deception operations* are essential to accomplishing surprise in almost any successful amphibious assault. Without deception, enemy intelligence could easily predict the selected beach(s) for the assault landing.

Predictability

It is logical to assume that threat forces analyze their own areas of responsibility for likely amphibious landing sites. It is also logical to assume that threat forces have access to our published doctrine, which outlines our normal preassault activities.

Therefore, potentially dangerous and inherent weaknesses exist in following doctrine to the letter. Amphibious planners must attempt to take advantage of predictability by use of deception and surprise.

A successful deception depends heavily on the enemy's quest for certainty in the chaos and fog of war.

This lesson examines *supporting*, *preassault*, and *deception operations* and the planning considerations for each based on current doctrine.

Required Readings

Joint Pub Readings

Joint Pub 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, chapters XIV and XV. Find this reading in the *Joint Pub Readings* Vol. II (8800), pp. 545 to 558. This publication provides guidance on the conduct of operations preceding the arrival of the main body in the landing area.

Joint Pub 3-58, *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*, Appendix A. Find this reading in the *Joint Pub Readings* Vol. III (8800), pp. 947 to 950. This publications provides an explanation of military deception terminology.

FMFM Readings

FMFM 7-13, *Military Deception*, Chapter 7. Find this reading in the *FMFM Readings* (8800), pp. 483 to 501. Today, as in the past, deception is an integral part of any amphibious operation.

For Further Study

Supplemental Readings

The readings listed are **not** required. They are provided as recommended sources of additional information about topics in this lesson that may interest you. They will increase your knowledge and augment your understanding of this lesson.

wJoint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces.

wJoint Pub 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

wJoint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

wJoint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning, Guidance, and Procedures.

wNaval Doctrine Pub 1, Naval Warfare.

wAllied Joint Pub 1, Allied Joint Operations Doctrine.

WAllied Training Pub 8, *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* (Combined Operations).

wQuilter, Charles J. II, (Col), USMCR. "U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm." History and Museums Division, HQMC. This is a required reading for *MAGTF Operations* (8807).

Issues for Consideration

Supporting Operations

Given the fact that supporting operations are conducted by forces other than those assigned to the ATF <u>and</u> that they are *normally* conducted outside the area for which the CATF is responsible, determine some possible examples of supporting operations that might occur in support of an amphibious assault.

Trade-Offs

The decision as to whether or not to conduct preassault operations must be weighed in terms of assets available, advantages, and disadvantages. Describe some of the trade-offs that should be considered by the CATF and CLF in the decision-making process.

CATF and CLF Planning

What impact does the decision to include deception in amphibious operations have on CATF and CLF planning?